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THEY CAN'T TAKE THAT A WAY FROM ME:1
PROTECTING FREE TRADE IN PUBLIC IMAGES
FROM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS
Ira J. Kaplan*
PROLOGUE

In ancient society, a hero was a person of apparently superhuman
powers, valor, or achievements who was deified or regarded as a demigod
after death.2 The hero's larger-than-life persona, it may be supposed,
made the hero suitable for epic poetry and drama. More accurately,
classical authors manipulated the image of these heroes to help make their
stories larger than life. By attributing certain characteristics to the hero,
classical authors were able to create a model for individual behavior and
an ideal for society.
One result of this manipulation is that the study of ancient mythology
is said to provide the modem reader reater insight into the ancient mind
than into the details of ancient history. So, although the heroic drama has
been received as a popular and valuable means of social discourse, that
value has not come from an objective or detached portrayal of the hero, but
by virtue of the story the author told with the heroic image. That is, the
value comes from the meaning imparted by the author's depiction of
virtue, as if it was encoded in the character like so much cultural DNA.

* Member of the State Bar of Massachusetts. Currently associated with General Electric
Company, Corporate Environmental Programs, Pittsfield, Mass. B.A., 1994, University of
Massachusetts-Amherst; J.D., 1997, University of Connecticut Law School. I would like to
thank Lewis Kurlantzick and Terry Tondro for their useful suggestions, and the editors and staff
of the Loyola of Los Angeles EntertainmentLaw Journal for their patience. Remaining errors
are my own. Direct comments to ira@vgemet.net.
1. IRA GERSHWIN, They Can't Take That Awayfrom Me (Gershwin Publ'g Corp. 1937).
2. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 852 (2d ed. 1983).

3. "The tales [of Gods and Heroes], though not to be trusted for their facts, are worthy of
all credit as pictures of manners; and it is beginning to be held that the manners and modes of
thinking of an age are a more important part of its history than the conflict of its peoples ...
THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S MYTHOLOGY viii (Avenel Books 1979).
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Heroes in modem society, whether they are athletes, entertainers,
business people, or presidents, are also models. Their images provide us
with a shorthand guide to behavior in a changing world. Instead of
preaching new notions of female sexuality, Madonna sets the example.
Instead of lamenting the rise in crime and the powerlessness of the
individual, Clint Eastwood fights back. Think of Ginger Rogers and Fred
Astaire displaying grace, or Michael Jordan, tenacity. They, or at least
their images, have become synonymous with the ideal they portray.
The fiction of heroism allows the users of heroic images to evoke an
ideal easily, quickly, and effectively. The ability to quickly evoke an ideal
makes the use of heroic images to convey media messages particularly
effective given the time constraints on television and radio and space
limitations in newspapers and magazines. 5 The communicative value of
heroic images is particularly well adapted to advertising 6where the use of
celebrity endorsements is a multibillion-dollar industry. By associating
their product with a hero's image, companies endeavor to create an image
for their product
with which consumers will seek to identify and ultimately
7
purchase.
In ancient Rome, wealthy patrons supported those writers whose
heroic dramas earned popular acclaim. Doubtless, the association enriched
the patron's social stature. Yet the value drama held for ancient viewers as
a model of virtue, or for us as inheritors of that legacy, is not diminished
by the fact that the author received compensation for his work. Nor is the
heroic depiction diminished because it is an appropriation of the fame of
the hero without consent and without compensation to the hero's estate.

4. Here, I use the word "hero" in a decidedly modem manner. A modem-day hero need
not be a moral exemplar but only possess fame. Thus, O.J. Simpson, Tonya Harding, Mike
Tyson, Howard Stem, and Dennis Rodman qualify in this respect.
5. See, e.g., Oliver R. Goodenough, Go Fish: Evaluatingthe Restatement's Formulationof
the Law of Publicity, 47 S.C. L. REv. 709, 718 (1996). See generally READING THE NEWS
(Robert K. Manoff& Michael Schudson eds., 1987).
6. See Eric R. Quinones, Ad Spending Growth Beats Expectations, CHI. SUN TIMEs, Dec. 9,

1997, at 59 (noting that advertisers spent a total of $187.77 billion in 1997).
7. See, e.g., Joseph Pereira, Fila Scores on an Assistfrom Grant Hill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5,

1996, at BI (concerning the effect of basketball star Grant Hill on Fila shoe sales). After
signing Mr. Hill to promote their sneakers, Fila's sales rose 37% to $532 million in 1995,
vaulting Fila to number three in sneaker sales in the United States.
[T]he key to the strategy, say Fila officials and marketing experts, was the signing
of Mr. Hill, a Detroit Piston with a "nice guy" image that appeals to the current
sensibilities of middle America. "Grant Hill could determine the destiny of our
company," says Howe Burch, vice president of advertising at Fila. [In exchange
for promoting sneakers bearing his name] Mr. Hill gets about $6 million a year
from Fila--$1 million plus 5% of the revenue from the sale of his shoes.
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For the ancient hero, greatness and the fame that accompanied
greatness provided ample compensation. The highest station a Roman
citizen could attain was to be in excelso aetatem (in the limelight). But
while the ancient hero and the hero's heirs did not seek pecuniary reward
for the manipulation of a heroic image, heroes today are protected from the
economic exploitation of their heroic value by the right of publicity.
1. INTRODUCTION

The right of publicity is an intellectual property right that protects
against the appropriation of one's name or likeness8 by providing a right to
sue for any unauthorized commercial use. 9 The right is now recognized in
twenty-five states by statute, common law, or a combination of both.10 It
was endorsed by the recent Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition."
8. The means of appropriation covered by the right of publicity vary from state to state.
The California statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1996), provides a cause of action
against the unpermitted use of a person's "name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness." In
addition, the California courts have adopted a distinct common law right of publicity that also
protects against look-alikes and sound-alikes. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App.
3d 409 (1983).
Protection under the New York statute is limited to a "name, portrait or picture." N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996). The New York Court of Appeals
held in Stephano v. News Group Publications,Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984), that, contrary
to the 1953 federal court decision in Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d
866 (2d Cir. 1953) (establishing the right of publicity in New York), actions for financial
damages could only be brought under the 1903 New York civil rights statute and thus preempted
a more expansive common law right of publicity. See Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing
Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 837-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp.
612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
9. Commercial use has been categorically defined to include merchandise bearing a name
or likeness, and uses advertising a separate product or service. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995). But see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that there is "no principled distinction
between speech and merchandise"); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
In addition, some non-commercial uses have been held to be violations, most notably the
use in a news broadcast. The Supreme Court recognized the right of publicity in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1976). Certain uses that would otherwise be
considered commercial have been exempt from the right of publicity either by decision,
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995) (exempting
advertisement for newspaper) or by statute, IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-1(c) (Michie 1994)
(exempting use that communicates information about an event or topic of general or public
interest).
10. For a survey of state rules, see J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICrrY AND
PRIVACY §§ 6.1[B], at 6-6, 9.5[A], at 9-31 (1996) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrrION § 46 (1995). According to the
Restatement, the right of publicity subjects to liability one who "appropriates the commercial
value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other
indicia of identity for purposes of trade .
I..."
Id.
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Typically, the right of publicity is invoked by celebrities who wish to
protect their own "publicity" value by limiting their exposure or seeking
compensation for the use of some aspect of their identity. As a property
right, the right of publicity has been held to be assignable 12 and
descendible13 in most jurisdictions where it is recognized.
When enforcing the right of publicity, courts typically consider only
that something was taken from the person depicted. Rarely do courts give
consideration to that which is taken from the public discourse.14 The goal
of this Article is to find the proper balance between protecting the ability
of individuals to control and profit from their own images, and the
freedom of others to invoke those images.
The current conflict among jurisdictions-half the states do not
recognize a right of publicity, and the twenty-five that do are at odds over
what is protected-decreases clarity. The lack of clarity in the law leads to
a chilling effect upon those who wish to evoke any public persona.
Because right of publicity claims against the national media may be
brought in any state recognizing the right, the rule of the jurisdiction that is
the most protective of publicity values tends to set that standard for the
nation. Only by clearly delineating what uses of a person's persona are
prohibited and what uses are allowed can any borderline reference be made
without fear of liability.
This Article reviews the justifications for the right of publicity and
examines
expanding the franchise to prohibit
look. 15 recent •decisions
16
• •
•
17
implied.1
is
endorsement
no
where
references
and
alikes, sound-alikes,
12. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enter. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The BiRite court stated:
Unlike privacy rights, which protect personality and feelings and are therefore not
assignable, the right of publicity gives rise to a 'proprietary' interest in the
commercial value of one's persona which is assignable and may be freely licensed
.... This proprietary interest is much like a copyright .... [I]t
embodies a
bundle of exclusive marketing rights which its holder may transfer in its entirety
by an assignment or in part by exclusive licenses. Holders of exclusive licenses
gain standing to protect their interests against all who would encroach on the
exclusive rights embodied in the licenses.
Id. at 1199-1200 (citations omitted).
13. MCCARTHY, supranote 10, § 9.5[B], at 9-32.
14. But see Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203,
216 (1954).
15. See, e.g., Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1984); cf Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
16. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
17. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cit. 1993); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831 (6th Cir. 1983); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
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The justification given for decisions where a right of publicity violation is
found, without an endorsement, either express or implied, is that the
attention-getting value of the person evoked is enough of an appropriation
to merit compensation.18 This Article challenges that theory for failing to
adequately account for countervailing First Amendment interests.
Section II places the right of publicity in perspective relative to other
intellectual property rights. Section III is a discussion of the forty-year
history of the right of publicity. Section IV is an examination of the right
of publicity as a doctrine that curtails a common yet exceptionally rich
brand of speech-simply because it is commercial. Section V develops a
free speech defense to right of publicity claims. Section VI is a critical
analysis of the broader justifications given for the right of publicity. This
section concludes that giving up the right to criticize or revere our heroes
is too high a price to pay, especially when a reference to them is not
deceptive.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY FROM OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
19
Originally, the right of publicity was rooted in the right of privacy.

Where the right of privacy protects against harm to a person's diynity, the
right of publicity protects the commercial value of one's identity.
1974); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
18. Professor McCarthy claims that merely attracting attention to a product benefits an
advertiser and thus there is no requirement of falsity or deception, only identifiability.
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 5.4[A], at 5-24; cf Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 627 n.8 (rejecting
defendant's argument in a look-alike case that there was no inference of endorsement by the
plaintiff, and stating that "[w]hen a public figure of Woody Allen's stature appears in an
advertisement, his mere presence is inescapably to be interpreted as an endorsement").
McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 5.4[D], at 5-38; see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004
(2d Cir. 1989).
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. Confusion arises from the wide acceptance of Dean Prosser's fourth tort of privacyappropriation-which included both economic and emotional harms caused by an unauthorized
exploitation of the plaintiffs identity. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 489
(1960). In some states, such as New York, the right of publicity is encompassed within the
statutory right of privacy. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1996). Some decisions suggest that an unauthorized use of a person's identity for purposes of
trade injures only commercial interests if the plaintiff is a celebrity and only dignitary interests
if the plaintiff is not well known. See, e.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir. 1984). Professor McCarthy believes that the famous and the not so famous have recourse to
both dignitary and economic harms under the two separate theories of privacy and publicity.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § I1.8[B], at 11-35. The reality may be that although
celebrities may not be precluded from obtaining damages for emotional loss, nor are the less
well known precluded from obtaining commercial damages, the relative fame of the plaintiff
will be reflected in damages. Unwanted publicity produces greater harm to the private person's
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In addition to requiring a lack of consent prior to finding a violation
to the right of publicity, states also require some showing of
identifiability.2 In Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc.,22 a man was able to
recognize his wife and daughter pictured from behind in a photographic
advertisement. The New York Court of Appeals held that a photograph
that did not show facial features could nevertheless reveal a person's
identity. 3 The court further held that it was sufficient that "someone
familiar with the persons in the photograph could identify them by looking
at the advertisement."2 4 Although only one person may need to identify
the plaintiff to establish liability, 5 the number of people26 who recognize or
identify the plaintiff is relevant to the issue of damages.
Most courts interpret right of publicity statutes broadly so that the
depiction need not be an authentic reproduction to be actionable. 2 7 When
a celebrity is not actually depicted in a photograph or heard in a recording,
courts have had to determine whether attenuated representations of their
identity were protected. For example, an illustration that was "somewhere
between representational art and cartoon" was found to satisfactorily
interest in maintaining his or her cherished obscurity, while uncompensated publicity hurts the
public person's greater expectation of financial compensation for the use of his or her cultivated
image. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. a (1995).
At the borderline of publicity and privacy claims are cases where one's celebrity value is
injured by excessive and abusive portrayals, particularly when the context of the unconsented
use is repugnant to the pirated personality. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093
(9th Cir. 1992); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974);
Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Wis. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. a (1995). Because of the different nature of the
claims, one commentator believes that right of privacy claims for dignitary harm should receive
only injunctive relief, whereas right of publicity claims for economic harm require only
compensatory damages. See Roberta R Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The FirstAmendment:
A Propertyand LiabilityRule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994).
21. The California statute states: "A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from
a photograph when one who views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably determine
that the person depicted in the photograph is the same person who is complaining of its
unauthorized use." CAL. C1V. CODE § 3344 (b)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
22. 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984) (the "Nude Back" case).
23. Id. at 309.
24. Id.
25. But see J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The
Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 129, 135 (1995) (describing the law as requiring that "more than a de minimis number of
ordinary viewers identify the plaintiff by looking at (or listening to) the defendant's
advertisement").
26. See Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
27. The California statute prohibits the appropriation of a person's "name, voice, signature,
photograph or likeness." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a). The New York statute prohibits the use of
one's "name, portrait or picture." N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1996).
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identify Muhammed All.
In White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc.,29 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the image of a robot
dressed in a blonde wig and turning letters on a set resembling that of the
Wheel of Fortunetelevision game show created a triable issue of fact for a
jury to determine whether the advertisement improperly used Vanna
White's "identity."3 0 The court noted that with greater fame came greater
recognizability: "The identities of the most popular celebrities are not only
the most attractive for advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke without
resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or voice." 3 1 However,
as Judge Kozinski noted, using the ability to evoke an identity as the
standard for finding liability may mean that "every famous person now has
32
an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of her."
One commentator criticized the White decision by pointing out that
"[a] celebrity's free-floating 'identity' may be nothing more than the 'idea'
of the celebrity. This may be particularly true when the 'identity' being
conveyed transcends that of the individual celebrity and evokes a more
general type, or 'generic celebrity,' that the individual has come to
signify."3 - A classic example was the case brought by the heirs of Bela
Lugosi to obtain the profits gained from appropriations of "his" role as
Count Dracula. 34 In the brightly illuminated world of Hollywood stardom,
it is no wonder that some confuse mortal actors with their larger-than-life
legacies.
The legal theory behind the right of publicity is claimed to be
analogous to that supporting otherS- intellectual
property rights such as
35
misrepresentation and misappropriation.
In InternationalNews Service
v. Associated Press ("INS"), 36 involving news stories pirated from one
news wire service by another, the Supreme Court held that although
factual information contained in an article is not subject to copyright
protection, 37 the literary aspect of an article is protected under the elastic
28. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

29. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
30. Id. at 1399.
31. Id.
32. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,

dissenting).
33. Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in Advertising: Some
Counterpoints to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 602 (1996).
34. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).

35. MCCARTHY, supranote 10, § 1.1[C], at 1-7.
36. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
37. But see MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 8.5[A][2], at 8-28 (noting that in the Gay
Olympics case "[tihe majority rejected the argument by the defendant organizers of the 'Gay
Olympic Games' that a prohibition on their use of the word 'Olympic' offended first amendment
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theory of misappropriation. 38 In the course of his opinion, Justice Pitney
compared misrepresentation, or passing off (the selling of one's inferior
goods under the name of another) with misappropriation (the selling of
another's goods, such as news stories written by another, under one's own
name). According to the Court, both were deceptive and both amounted to
unfair competition.
Elements of both misrepresentation and misappropriation appear in
right of publicity claims. The only difference is that the "goods" being
sold are people's images. When an impersonator is used to evoke
someone else, such use is a type of misrepresentation. In other words, the
impersonator is being passed-off as someone else, particularly if confusion
is likely.
Preventing deception protects the public from false
endorsements and the person portrayed from unwanted associations.
Although a legitimate concern, false endorsements may be adequately
prevented by trademark law.
When someone's name or likeness is used in a commercial setting,
such use, by itself, has been called a form of misappropriation. 39 But
unlike the misappropriation of news reportage work-product that occurred
in INS, the property taken when someone's name or image is used is
neither a stylistic nor substantive creation of a work. Just as the daily
events that comprise the essence and the object of news reporting cannot
be stolen, the "essence" of public heroes is beyond appropriation. Like
ideas, the essence of heroes may only be described in context and it is only
this description that may be copyrighted or, the work performed in its
creation, appropriated. In addition, like the expression of an idea, there is
nothing intrinsically deceptive about the depiction of an image.
Yet most jurisdictions have held that under the right of publicity a
use need not be deceptive to be actionable. Proof that the identified person
is perceived to be associated with or endorses the user's goods or services
is not required for the imposition of liability.
Merely attracting the
attention of potential consumers and thereby gaining a commercial
advantage upon the notoriety of another is sufficient to create a violation
policies because it prohibited defendant from using the only word that could succinctly convey
defendant's political message that homosexual men and women can participate in athletics at an
Olympic level of proficiency").
38. But misappropriation law has been criticized for creating a common law vehicle to
limit speech without protecting the public interest in access to works as in copyright's balance
between ideas and expressions. See InternationalNews Serv., 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions,
and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.").
39. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 5.6[B], at 5-55.
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 47 cmt. a (1995).
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of the right of publicity. 4 1 Even an advertisement expressly disclaiming
endorsement, for example, one that says "Bill Clinton doesn't chew Day's
Work tobacco but you should" would be actionable. Thus, the right of
publicity applies to a mere evocation unlike misappropriation or
misrepresentation law which both require a showing of deception.
Under copyright law, only those fixed and unique components of the
author's original work, though they make use of ideas or factual
information, are given legal protection. The Supreme Court has noted that
"[t]o this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work. ,,42 Thus, a photograph of a model, the
recording of a live musical performance, or a biography of a president are
all covered by copyright. However, the unfixed object of the photograph,
recording, or biography is more akin to an idea, which, because it is
ephemeral, cannot be copied. Thus, the essence of the living object upon
which the expression was based remains outside the reach of copyright
law. Right of publicity law, on the other hand, makes people's images into
"things."
In addition, a transformative use such as parody that uses the original
work, while also adding something new, may be considered fair use and
not an infringement of the prior copyrighted work.43 The public interest in
critical commentary is reflected in the rule that copyright holders do not
retain licensing control over critical derivative works. In such cases the
new work may be copyrighted as an original work. 44
Another source of intellectual property law is the Lanham Act,45
under which a likelihood-of-confusion standard applies to protect against
false endorsements. 46 At the same time, the Act exempts from liability the
"fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
41. Id. § 47 cmt. c.
42. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). In setting

a balance between ideas and expressions, the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-1010
(1994), codifies the constitutional provision to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
43. The fair use exception, section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, provides a framework

for making a determination concerning the use of a copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107
("The fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."); see, e.g.,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 103.
45. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(1994)).
46. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).

46
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advertising[,] ... non-commercial use of a mark ... [and] all forms of

news reporting and news commentary. ' '47 Therefore, deceptive uses, those
likely to confuse consumers, are prohibited, while honest references are
protected even if motivated by a quest for commercial gain as in
comparative advertising.
One court, in recognizing a parody defense to a right of publicity
claim, held that if a reference is made to a person and there is no deception
causing confusion either as to identity or endorsement, the right of
publicity ought not apply. 48 And some commentators have argued an
analogy to the proposition presented under copyright law that "[n]o author
may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates." 49 The information
provided by a mere reference to someone, particularly someone in the
public eye, they contend, should also be considered
within the public
50
domain and exempt from the right of publicity.
III. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

With only forty years of case law, 5 1 one anomalous U.S. Supreme
Court case endorsing it, 52 and various standards among the states, the right
of publicity has not yet solidified. However, an examination of its history
can help explain how the law has developed.
A. The Right of Privacy ProtectsAgainst DignitaryHarms
The foundation for the right of privacy was laid by the famous 1890

essay The Right to Privacy written by Samuel Warren and Louis
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (4). But see Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228
(7th Cir. 1993) ("[Plarody is not an affirmative defense but an additional factor in the
analysis.").
48. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.
1996) (reading a parody defense into Oklahoma's statutory right of publicity). But see White v.
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to grant a parody defense

against the California common law right of publicity).
49. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
50. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership ofPublic Image, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125,
181 n.271 (1993) (arguing that the existing law of false advertising, defamation, and "false
light" privacy obviates the need for creating an assignable and descendible property right in
identity for celebrities).
51. The seminal right of publicity case was Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). In Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d
580 (N.Y. 1984), the court limited assignability rights (a key holding in Haelan) by finding
statutory preemption against a common law right of publicity. Thus, Professor Barnett refers to
the seminal case as a bad seed. See Barnett, supranote 33, at 596 n.18.
52. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See discussion infra Part
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Brandeis. 53 The essence of the article was that an intrusive press was
"overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency" in its search for sensation. 54 In doing this, the press was
55
invading what amounted to a right to privacy-the right to be left alone.
It should be noted that the harm addressed was not economic, but arose
from 5the
affront to human dignity caused by public disclosure of private
6
facts.
57
In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals, in Roberson v. Rochester,
rejected a claim for emotional distress resulting from the unauthorized use
58
of the plaintiffs portrait on 25,000 copies of an advertisement for flour.
The court refused to accept such a right for fear of restricting the press
based on a mere "comment on one's looks." 59 The court refrained from
engaging in any line-drawing between protected and non-protected speech
and expressly deferred to the legislature.
Accepting this invitation, the
New York legislature enacted a statute imposing criminal and civil liability
for the unauthorized use of a person's name, portrait, or picture for
"advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade."
Soon after Roberson, the Georgia Supreme Court took the step that
the New York court resisted and recognized the right of privacy in
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. 62 Pavesich involved the
unauthorized use of the plaintiffs photograph in an advertisement for life
insurance. The advertisement compared the photographs of two men, one
appearing down on his luck (suggesting he had not purchased a New
England Life insurance policy), and the other showing the plaintiff with
the caption: "In my healthy and productive period of life I bought
insurance in the New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., of Boston,

53. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
54. Id. at 196.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 215-16.
57. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.

Id. at 443.
Id.
Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308; see MCCARTHY, supra note 10, §

6.9, at 6-60.5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITON § 46 (1995).

New York's

privacy statute, although initially aimed at redressing emotional damage, does not expressly
distinguish between dignitary and economic harms. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996). This became an issue in the first true right of publicity case.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.

62. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
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Mass., and to-day [sic] my family 63is protected and I am drawing an annual
dividend on my paid-up policies."
The statement attributed to Pavesich was~untrue and damaging to his
reputation because it painted him as a liar (for saying he had life insurance
when in fact he did not) and thus the advertisement likely amounted to
libel. 64 In addition, if the same testimonial was printed today it would
likely be actionable as a false endorsement under the Lanham Act.
Whether called libel, false endorsement, or a violation of his right to
privacy, the use of the statement wrongly attributed to Pavesich was
appropriately considered an infringement because it was not truthful.
Preventing deception is a legitimate reason for curtailing speech,
particularly speech about private figures.
However, the Pavesich court went further and wholly rejected the
65
idea that a threat to free speech was posed by granting a right of privacy.
Instead, it held that limiting such a right to commercial uses would avoid
any unconstitutional deprivation: "There is in the publication of one's
picture for advertising purposes not the slightest semblance of an
expression of an idea, a thought, or an opinion, within the meaning of the
constitutional provision which guarantees to a person the right to publish
6
his sentiments on any subject.", §
Two subsequent developments in First Amendment law severely
limit this rationale, especially when the advertisement in question concerns
a public figure. First, since 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently
held that non-deceptive commercial speech is protected expression under
the First Amendment. 67 Second, since 1964, libel law has given greater
deference to speech about public figures. 68 An expectation that public
figures should withstand a greater degree of public scrutiny is the basis for
the "actual malice" standard. The standard, which is often difficult to
prove, requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant knew the falsity of
the libelous statement or showed a reckless disregard for the truth. 69 The
standard reflects the need to give adequate breathing space to speech and

63. Id. at 68-69.
64. Id. at 81.
65. Id. at 74.
66. Id. at 80.
67. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
68. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
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of public figures even when the
less deference to the dignitary concerns
70
political.
not
is
speech
offending
The actual malice standard, adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 1 resulted from a newspaper
72
advertisement that sought to raise funds for the civil rights movement.
The plaintiff claimed that the advertisement made false and disparaging
references about him in his official capacity as an Alabama city
commissioner.73 By finding for the newspaper, the Court afforded free
speech protection even though the challenged expression was in the form
of an advertisement. Although the "product" advertised in Sullivan was
the civil rights movement, the nature of the product does not, under most
right of publicity statutes, protect an advertiser from a right of publicity
claim. 74 It would be disturbing indeed to find that even an oblique
reference to Sullivan might now allow him to succeed under a right of
publicity claim. Commercial speech provides a forum for the depiction of
public figures.
Whether used to cast derision or to laud their
accomplishments, commercial speech concerning public figures ought to
receive First Amendment protection as long as it is not deceptive.
B. Extending Protectionto Economic Harms
Originally, public figures, at least while portrayed in their public
roles, were not protected by the right of privacy because the right was
limited to remedying dignitary harms resulting from unauthorized use.
Public figures, it was reasoned, could not seek publicity and then sue for
the harm publicity caused. 75 Their foray into the public limelight was
considered an implied consent. In O'Brien v. PabstSales Co.,76 a famous
football player sued the Pabst Beer Company for their use of his
photograph on the 1939 Pabst Blue Ribbon beer calendar. The plaintiff
was particularly upset because, at the time, he was actively advocating
against the use of alcohol. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his
70. The actual malice standard has also been invoked for evaluating and ultimately
dismissing claims of dignitary harm brought under an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and invasion of privacy resulting from a mock advertisement in Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell,485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
71. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

72. Id. at 256-57.
73. Id.
74. See infra note 96 (discussing exemptions from the right of publicity for news and the
arts); see also Beverley v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1991)
(involving the successful right of publicity claim brought against a women's health clinic).
75. Nimmer, supra note 14, at 205.
76. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL

50

[Vol. 18

right of privacy claim, holding that the calendar was not an endorsement."
Furthermore, the court held that as a public person O'Brien could not be
injured by "the publicity ... which he had been constantly seeking and
receiving. ' T By seeking fame, this celebrity had waived his right of
privacy. To overcome the limitations posed by the emerging right of
privacy, a new legal theory was required. In Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,79 which involved rival baseball card
manufacturers' use of player photographs, Judge Jerome Frank created the
"right of publicity" to provide a remedy for the economic damage done by
an unauthorized use, not for the dignitary harms dealt with by the right of
privacy. Judge Frank stated that:
In addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy.., a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture
and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e.,
without an accompanying grant of a business or of anything
else.... This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it
is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in
newspapers, magazines, busses [sic], trains and subways.
C. Protectingthe Assignee
So prominent persons would not feel "sorely deprived" because they
had not received payment for authorized advertisements, the Haelan court
provided "an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using
their pictures."8 1 Although, the injured party in Haelan was not an abused
ballplayer but a rival card manufacturer, the argument was that
endorsements would yield no value to the celebrity if the assignee could
not enforce the exclusive right to exploit them. However, denial of the
right of publicity for any truthful reference would not destroy the
endorsement market.
Instead, compensation could be limited to
endorsements and not extend to mere references. Courts would have to

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 170.
Id.
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
Id. at 868.
Id.
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decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether an endorsement was improperly
implied. If obtained without consent, a photograph of Michael Jordan
holding a box of Wheaties would be actionable if it created a false
impression of endorsement. Alternatively, a poster showing Michael
Jordan dunking a basketball ought not be actionable, much like a poster of
the Statue of Liberty or Yosemite National Park. These are national
treasures and references to them ought to be a protected part of our shared
cultural lexicon.
The interests of assignee-sponsors are an integral element of, and
powerful political force behind, the right of publicity. By omitting this
aspect of right of publicity jurisprudence, its supporters maintain a false
vigil in support of the "used" individual. A more accurate definition of the
right of publicity when assigned to a third party might be "the right to
purchase from an individual the ability to prevent any reference to that
individual by anyone else in any commercial context."
IV. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY LIMITS COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Professor McCarthy, author of a leading treatise on the subject,
defines the right of publicity as "the inherent right of every human being to
control the commercial use of his or her identity." 82 However, the right to
control the use of one's name or likeness, whether the use is obvious or
obscure, cannot be inherent, innate, intrinsic, or essential as long as "use"
means speech and the First Amendment applies. 83 Sometimes speech is
not "speech." Obscenity, for example, has been held to be outside the
scope of First Amendment protection. 84 But over the last twenty years, the
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment
protects non-deceptive commercial speech. 85 A state may only restrict
commercial speech if it can show that the restriction directly and
materially advances a substantial state interest in a manner no "more

82. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 1.I[A][1], at 1-2.
83. The First Amendment only protects speech from regulation by the government.
Application of a state right of publicity statute has been deemed sufficient state action to allow a
First Amendment defense. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95
F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996). Of course, courts need not reach the issue of state action if they
hold that the scope of First Amendment protection is not broad enough to apply to commercial
appropriations of another's persona. See McCARTHY, supranote 10, § 8.6[B], at 8-22 n.30.
84. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
85. See In re RIM.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("Truthful advertising related to lawful
activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular content
or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has
proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate
restrictions.").
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extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Once it is accepted that commercial speech is "speech," any right to
control speech that evokes one's identity must be balanced against the
right of others to evoke that identity. To paraphrase Justice Holmes'
description of libel, it may be said that what we give to the right of
publicity we take from the freedom of speech.
A. Rationalefor FirstAmendment Protectionof Non-Commercial
Speech ConcerningCelebrities
Contrary to Professor McCarthy's contention that control of identity
is an inherent human right, the need for balancing the control of speech
evoking a persona with the interests guaranteed by the First Amendment is
an assumption in Professor McCarthy's own definition of the right of
publicity. If the right to control the use of one's identity was a
fundamental inalienable right,87 it would not be necessary to limit such
control to commercial use. Yet, Professor McCarthy's definition, and
much right of publicity law, expressly exempts "non-commercial" speech
from right of publicity actions. As expressed in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition, "[t]he name, likeness, and other indicia of a person's
identity are used 'for purposes of trade' [only] if they are used in
advertising the user's goods or services, or are placed on merchandise
marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services rendered by
the user." 88 If control of identity was a fundamental right, it would not be
consistently overcome by the broad variety of speech defined as "noncommercial."
With very few exceptions, 89 right of publicity claims have been
denied when use was made of a person's identity in books, newspaper or
magazine articles, on television or radio shows, in films or9plays, and
sometimes in advertising incidental to such permitted uses.
In fact,
almost any non-commercial use will be allowed without violating the right
of publicity no matter how much the medium depends for its success on
the attention-getting ability of the used persona. The rationale behind the
86. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
87. "The most persuasive rationale which gave rise to and continues to provide reasoned
support for the Right of Publicity is that human identity is a natural and self-evident property
right." MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 4.8[D], at 4-47.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
89. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Estate of Elvis
Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1015 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986); MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 8.15[A], at 8-99.
90. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1(c) (Michie 1994).
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exemption from right of publicity claims for non-commercial uses is that
the benefit to social discourse outweighs the economic burden to the
exploited individual.
The value of speech rationale has been construed quite broadly.
Courts, for good reason, are reluctant to weigh the value of speech in a
particular case. People Magazine and Entertainment Tonight are two
obvious, but not unique, examples of speech protected by the First
Amendment that are sold solely upon the attention-getting value of
celebrities. Arguably, the images presented in these venues are more than
attention-getting ploys and do have independent expressive value. But
even if an empirical examination could reveal some value, advertisements,
it must be admitted, are at least as valuable. One distinction between
advertising and non-commercial speech, it has been argued, is that
advertising is concerned primarily with selling something, and therefore, is
intrinsically' less valuable and less deserving of First Amendment
protection.
However, bright-line distinctions based upon the speaker's
identity and intent have led to incongruous results.
In Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.,92 former San Francisco
Forty-Niner quarterback Joe Montana sued the San Jose Mercury News for
printing an artistic rendition of him in a special section of the newspaper
and then selling the portrait separately in poster form. The court held that
the poster and the newspaper publication were both protected by the First
Amendment "because Montana was a major player in contemporaneous
newsworthy sports events. '9 3 Yet if the poster had been printed by a
poster company, the newsworthiness defense probably would not have
prevailed.94 Thus, the same message may be permitted or prohibited
depending on the messenger and the messenger's perceived intention.
However, the motives of the news media are not so pure. The news
media promote themselves by exploiting images of personalities.
Acknowledging that the newspaper appropriated Montana's identity for
self-promotion, the court held that a newspaper has a constitutional right to
promote itself by reproducing its news stories as long as the advertising
does not create the impression that the person endorses the news
medium. 95 In so doing, the court overlooked the appropriation claim and

91. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 8.11[B][31, at 8-84 (contending that the primary
message of the advertisement in the White case is "buy Samsung VCR's").
92. 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995).
93. Id.at 794.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITON § 47 cmt. b (1995).
95. Montana, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 796-97.
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the commercial context in favor of the expressive element of the
publication as a traditional forum for news.
Once it is accepted that some speech outweighs right of publicity
claims, the tough question is to decide how to properly balance the
competing interests. In Montana, the court felt that only deception should
limit bona fide expression evoking public persons. But if the media are
protected by the newsworthiness of a portrayal because speech about
public figures is important, it would seem that the same ability to
commend or castigate public figures ought to extend to non-media
speakers as well.
B. Developing FirstAmendment ProtectionFor Commercial
Speech ConcerningCelebrities
The argument given in favor of the almost complete First
Amendment protection for non-commercial uses is that public policy
favors the dissemination of a broad range of ideas, including references to
individuals, particularly those in the public spotlight, whether the use is in
the form of news or entertainment.
This argument is roughly analogous
to the justification behind libel law which gives greater
protection
to a
•
7
defendant who impugns the reputation of a public figure.
The aim of
both is to encourage public discourse on a wide range of public issues.
The corollary of this argument presented by Professor McCarthy is that
because commercial speech is given the "lowest level of constitutional
weight," it serves no such public interest. 98 To bolster his argument,
Professor McCarthy describes a three-part hierarchy of speech. At the top
is news ("information about the real world"), next are stories (fiction and
entertainment), and at the bottom is advertising ("a context that neither
informs nor entertains, but sells"'). 99 Yet if an advertisement neither
informs nor entertains it is doubtful that it can sell.

96. The California statute limits right of publicity claims by creating exceptions for "news,
public affairs, or sports broadcast, or account, or any political campaign .. " CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344(d) (West Supp. 1996). Nevada provides no violation where the likeness is used in
connection with news or art, is an impersonation in a live performance, or is without relation to
commercial sponsorship. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.790(2)(a)-(e) (Michie 1994). Indiana
exempts uses in literary, theatrical and musical works, film, radio, television programs, fime art,
material with political or newsworthy value, advertisements for all such uses (referred to as
incidental uses) and reports on topics of general or public interest. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-1
(Michie 1994).
97. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
98. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 8.2[A], at 8-12.
99. Id. at 8-12-8-13.
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Professor McCarthy responds that even if a particular advertisement
informs or entertains, its "primary" message is still "buy" as revealed by
the fact that a commercial seller pays the media to publish or broadcast the
message. 00
If advertisements were valuable, McCarthy contends,
consumers would pay to see them, and since consumers do not pay,
advertisements must not have value.10 1 Because the primary message of
advertising is "buy," according to Professor McCarthy, its limitation does
not curtail any valuable ideas.
Professor McCarthy would have us believe that when balancing
freedom of speech and the right of publicity, commercial speech is a class
of speech so distinct and so lacking in value that it is automatically and
entirely outweighed by the right to control any personal reference. There
are two problems with this approach. First, the hazy line between
commercial and non-commercial speech does not separate valuable speech
from worthless speech. Advertising has a long tradition in this country as
an important means of expression.
Second, the Supreme Court
has held
03
that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment.1
1. Difficulties Distinguishing Commercial Speech from Speech
Receiving Greater First Amendment Protection
Professor McCarthy's approach arbitrarily divides the continuum of
social speech into two categories: (1) commercial speech, which is
considered intrinsically less valuable; and (2) all other speech, which is
considered more valuable and therefore deserves greater constitutional
protection. The danger, as with any bright-line rule, is that courts
automatically grant greater or lesser protection to speech based on
mechanical categorizations without considering the rationale from which
the categories are derived. Courts ask, "Is this a commercial use? Is this a
protected medium?" The answers to these questions hardly prove the
value of a given use to the greater social discourse. The result is that
references to famous individuals in certain media, or in the marketing of
certain goods, 1are
actionable, while other similarly exploitive uses in other
4
media are not. 0

100. McCarthy, supra note 25, at 137.
101. Id.
102. See Madow, supra note 50, at 156-58.
103. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761-62 (1976).
104. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 7.1[D], at 7-6 n.16.
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In Uhlaender v. Henricksen,10 5 the court prohibited the use of
baseball players' names and statistics in a board game while accepting that
the use of the same names and information would be protected if in a book.
In a similar case involving the use of golfers' names and statistics in a
board game, 106 the court said that while use of names in the dissemination
of news is proper, use of the same information "for the purpose of
capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commercial
project is not.10 7 It would seem that if true factual information including
names and statistics is valuable to the public and is therefore protected in
book form, the same information is just as valuable when presented in a
board game and should be equally protected. But in a case brought by
Howard Hughes against the makers of "The Howard Hughes Game,"' 1 8 a
New York court justified the distinction saying that:
In reality, defendants are not disseminating news. They are not
educating the public as to the achievements of Howard Hughes.
They are selling a commodity, a commercial product, an
entertaining game of chance, the outcome of which is
determined by maneuvering tokens on a game board by the
throw of the dice. The use of plaintiffs name, biographical data
etc. in this context is not legitimate to the public interest. It is
merely the medium used to market a commodity .... 109
In other areas of intellectual property law, new uses of facts and ideas
are protected regardless of the medium. Under copyright law, the unique
ordering of factual information, even in as pedestrian a format as a
telephone book, is encouraged by allowing new versions while preventing
unauthorized copies of the exact same expression. 110 Similarly, the
transformative nature of sports statistics when incorporated into a
children's board game builds on a storehouse of shared knowledge to
develop a new creation. Restricting this market hurts creators and deprives
the public. Some say that payment for the use of facts about athletes
should be figured into the costs of production, but, should children, or we
as a society, pay professional athletes for the right to speak about them?
Both copyright and trademark protection are intellectual property
rights of Constitutional magnitude. They balance property interests
against concerns for over-limiting free public use-either as a policy for
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
Palmer v. Schonhom Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. 1967).
Id. at 462.
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
Id. at 146.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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allowing greater industry or upon a principle of encouraging the broadest
dissemination of expression for its own sake.' 1 That the right of publicity
does not have a mandate in the letter of the Constitution should not allow it
to ignore the Constitution's spirit.
Unlike copyright law, where limited monopoly protection of
expression is justified to protect the fruits of creation, encourage creation,
and reward hard work, such justification does not support the right of
publicity. Because endorsement revenue is only tangential to a celebrity's
fame as an actor or athlete (professions which already pay lucrative
salaries) there is little risk that
a loss of advertising dividends will deprive
2
society of their creativity."1
Moreover, it is possible that the creator of a product or advertisement
could express ideas or opinions valuable to the public discourse in addition
to any intention to sell or as a means to incite sales. Concern for the
bottom line does not preclude creativity. Even if the primary intention is
to sell, and a name or likeness is used primarily to stimulate consumer
interest, the expression, on its own, can still speak for itself.
In Beverley v. Choices Women's Medical Center, Inc. 113 the
defendant medical center created a calendar that illustrated people and
events important in the women's movement. A doctor who appeared at a
"Women in Medicine" conference was shown in a photograph in the
calendar and sued the medical center. Notwithstanding the informational
and historical value of the calendar and the public interest in the promotion
of the defendant's services, the trial court granted summary judgment for
the plaintiff. 1 4 The New York Court of Appeals, noting that the defendant
was not a "media enterprise," " 5 upheld the lower court's decision, saying
that the defendant "may not unilaterally neutralize or override the longstanding and significant statutory privacy protection by wrapping its
advertising message in the cloak of public interest, however commendable
116
the educational and informational value."
Thus the appellate court, under the shibboleth that commercial
speech is valueless, appears to hold that although this expression was
neither deceptive nor valueless, it evaded protection by the First
Amendment simply because it was "commercial." The court stated that
"[t]he pervasive and prominent placement of [defendant's] name, logo,
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
See Madow, supra note 50, at 208.
587 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 277.
Id. at 279.
Id.

58

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENVT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

address and telephone number on each page of the calendar, [and] the wide
scope of distribution . . . leave no doubt that the calendar is commonly
recognized as quintessential advertising material." 7 The protection of a
public person's right to prevent the publication of her photograph at a
public event was thus held more important than the public's interest in the
truthful dissemination of historical events in a particularly accessible
format.
Conversely, in a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, a First Amendment defense to a right of publicity claim
prevailed, in part, because the court held that baseball trading cards were
not commercial speech."18 In Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
119
Players Ass 'n,
which involved the satirical use of baseball players on
trading cards, the court realized that settling a right of publicity claim
involves more than allocating resources. 12 Granting monopoly control
over an image prevents artistic, cultural and political references to those
popular icons we use to describe, applaud and criticize all sorts of social
phenomena: "Because celebrities are an important part of our public
vocabulary, a parody of a celebrity does not merely lampoon the celebrity,
but exposes 12the
weakness of the idea or value that the celebrity symbolizes
1
in society."'
In adopting a parody defense resembling the fair use exception of
copyright law, the Cardtoons court recognized that a transformative use
that mocks the original impliedly denies endorsement and that while
making at least a passing reference to the individual parodied, such
commentary "added a significant creative component of its own ... and
created an entirely new product. Indeed, allowing [the baseball players] to
control or profit from the parody tradin~ cards would actually sanction the
theft of Cardtoons' creative enterprise."
The court refused to accept the Major League Baseball Players
Association's argument that trading cards were not a traditional forum for
communication and were thus exempt from First Amendment

117. Id. at 278.
118. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (1996)
("Cardtoons' trading cards, however, are not commercial speech-they do not merely advertise
another unrelated product. Although the cards are sold in the marketplace, they are not
transformed into commercial speech merely because they are sold for profit.") (citing Virginia
State Bd.of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 761).
119. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
120. Id. at 974.
121. ld. at 972.
122. Id. at 976.
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protection. 123 Citing cases protecting pamphlets, handbills, yard signs, flag
burning and nude dancing, the court noted that speech was protected even
if it occurred in a non-traditional medium of expression. 24 Baseball cards,
the court held, "have been an important means of informing the public
about baseball players for over a century."' 125 Thus, under Cardtoons it
protection
seems that as long as a use is transformative,
126First Amendment
will extend to posters, buttons, and T-shirts.
Transformative speech, such as parody, is only one example of
speech that, since it comments on the original, does not imply an
endorsement. If Walmart were to run an advertisement saying, "Shop at
Walmart. We don't sell the works of Madonna because we believe in God
and Country," the advertisement could easily be held a violation of the
right of publicity. Walmart would be trading on the celebrity value of
Madonna to boost sales of their other products. Yet, if the announcement
of this corporate boycott is truthful, what right does Madonna have to
prevent such an announcement? If she wishes to run an advertisement
saying that the CEO of Walmart is a closed-minded opportunist, she
should have that right as well. And if the public chooses to frequent or
avoid Walmart because of the advertised information, the debate on speech
is enlivened and the public enlightened.
The distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech
within a single medium seems particularly arbitrary. A right of publicity
claim may be brought against the makers of a television commercial but
not against the show the commercial sponsors. However, it is doubtful
that a court can detect any greater value of speech delivered by
programming than from the advertisements that surround it. In some
sense, advertisements have greater public speech value-they deliver
practical messages about consumer products, they speak to (not at) us, and
given time constraints, they must be more effective at communicating than
programming.
If there is social meaning in media, Marshall McLuhan contends that
advertising is its leading purveyor:
[Advertising is a] huge educational enterprise.., whose twelvebillion-dollar annual budget approximates the national school

123. Id. at 969.
124. Id.
125. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969.

126. The court limited its holding to parodies on merchandise, refusing to extend First
Amendment protection to parodies in advertising, thereby not completely disagreeing with the
Ninth Circuit's decision in White v. SamsungElec.Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). Id.
at 970.
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budget. Any expensive ad represents the toil, attention, testing,
wit, art, and skill of many people. Far more thought and care go
into the composition of any prominent ad in a newspaper or
magazine than go into the writing of their features and
editorials.... [Advertisements] are magnificent accumulations
of material about the shared experience and feelings of the
The historians and archaeologists will
entire community ....
one day discover that the ads of our time are the richest and
that any society ever made of its
most faithful daily reflections
27
activities.'
of
range
entire
That images are used to advertise products, or are emblazoned on posters
and T-shirts, does not detract from their communicative value. The use of
celebrity images in advertising and on goods is a quintessentially
Certainly, mass media has undergone
American means of expression.
tremendous change in the twentieth century. The real change, as Professor
heroes feel
Madow contends, is not technological, but that our modem-day
29
adulation.1
social
their
for
compensated
be
to
a need
2. Commercial Speech Is Protected by the First Amendment
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed greater regulation of
commercial speech, it has not justified such limitations on the lesser
intrinsic value of commercial speech but, typically, on a state's police
powers. This sort of time, place, or manner restriction on speech has been
justified not as a regulation of speech qua speech, but as a regulation of the
accompanying action.

127. MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENsIONS OF MAN 228-32

(1964).
128. See Madow, supra note 50, at 149 (noting the commercialization of the Founders'
personae). Madow quotes Benjamin Franklin in a letter to his daughter:
[Medallions], pictures, busts, and prints, (of which copies upon copies are spread

everywhere) have made your father's face as well known as that of the moon, so
that he durst not do any thing that would oblige him to run away, as his phiz
would discover him wherever he should venture to show it. It is said by learned
etymologists that the name Doll, for the images children play with, is derived from

the word IDOL [sic]; from the number of dolls now made of him, he may truly be
said, in thatsense, to be i-doll-ized in this country.
Id. (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Sarah Bache (June 3, 1779), in MR. FRANKLIN:
A SELECTION FROM HIS PERSONAL LETTERS 45, 45-46 (Leonard N. Labaree & Whitfield J.
Bell, Jr. eds., 1956)).

129. See Madow, supra note 50, at 150. Professor Madow's contention is that "the
Founders grudgingly sat for portraitists and sculptors as a matter of "patriotic duty," . . .
[knowing that] mass-marketed household artifacts and decorative objects.., helped to establish

a genuinely democratic national iconography." Id.
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In United States v. O'Brien,13 the defendant O'Brien was convicted
of illegally burning his draft card in violation of federal law.13 ' The
Supreme Court held that the law was targeted at the actions of individuals,
not the speech in opposition to the draft communicated by burning a draft
card and upheld the conviction. 132 The Court based its decision on the
grounds that the regulation the government was enforcing served a
purpose---"the smooth and proper functioning of the system that Congress
has established to raise armies"--unrelated to suppression of
expression. 133 The Court held that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."'134 To
prevent attempts at unconstitutional suppression of the communicative
elements of expression, the O'Brien Court devised a three part test to
guarantee that the government regulation is justified: (1) it must further a
substantial government interest; (2) it must be unrelated to the suppression
of expression; and (3) the restriction on speech
must be no greater than is
135
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
When applied to commercial speech, the Court has found that
regulations that protect against deceptive advertising satisfy a legitimate
government interest: "In light of the greater potential for deception or
confusion in the context of certain advertising messages,... content-based
restrictions on commercial speech may be permissible." 136 Thus, the
potential for deception has created an appearance of a lesser, or at least
137
different, level of protection for commercial speech.
Truthful commercial speech, on the other hand, has been considered
important and fully protected by the First Amendment. In Virginia State

130. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
131. Id. at 369-70.
132. See id. at 385-86.
133. Id. at 381.

134. Id. at 376.
135. Id.at 377.
136. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
137. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562 (1980) ("[Olur decisions have recognized 'the "commonsense" distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation, and other varieties of speech."'); cf Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 419 (1993) (holding that Cincinnati could not restrict newsrack accessibility to those
newspapers considered non-commercial and noting that the "city's argument attaches more
importance to the distinction between commercial and non commercial speech than our cases
warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech").

62

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 18

Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,138 the
Court supported First Amendment protection for speech that did no more
than propose a commercial transaction. As a policy matter, the Court
believed that public interest in the free flow of consumer information
might well exceed public interest for political debate, and therefore, unless
deceptive, deserved protection. 139 In addition, the Court saw at least
potential value in commercial speech that it did not wish to foreclose,
holding that commercial speech could, and often does, contain meaningful
expression even though the primary interest of the speaker may be
economic: "Obviously, not all commercial messages contain the same or
even a very great public interest element. There are few to which such an
element, however, could not be added ....We see little
140 point in requiring
[them] to do so, and little difference if [they do] not."
of
Thus, the only requirements for full First Amendment protection 141
misleading.
nor
illegal
neither
be
speech
the
that
is
commercial speech
Yet, as currently construed, the right of publicity intrudes on commercial
speech that is neither.
V. APPLICATION OF A FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST TO
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS

A. PreventingDeception is a LegitimateAim
Is it socially desirable to allow public figures the right to censor and
to extract pay from those who make references to them and their
accomplishments, particularly when our heroes are already paid
handsomely for their accomplishments? Should they have monopoly
control over their fame or do we, as cultural stockholders, have a share in
the currency of their celebrity to spend as we please?
The law should provide for a public use of heroes, whether they are
athletes, entertainers, or politicians, if the use is not deceptive or if a false
endorsement is not implied. Instead of assuming that every use is a
use is allowed, unless and
theft,"' it might be better to assume that every
until it is shown in a particular case that there is some sort of deception.

138. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
139. Id. at 763.
140. Id. at 764-65.
141. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 ("For commercial speech to come within [the First
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.").
142. Compare this proposition with the position taken by McCarthy: "why not" protect
publicity rights. McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.1[B], at 2-4.1.
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Analogous limits on the deceptive use of others' identities are set by
145
libel law,143 trademark law,144 and unfair competition law.

By

prohibiting only speech that amounts to a deception, these bodies of law
implicitly protect speech that is truthful, factual, and original thereby
encouraging fair competition and greater inventiveness. Likewise, in cases
where reference is made to an individual, the mere reference should not be
enough to trigger liability. Instead, actual confusion as to endorsement
should be required. Honest references aid consumers, deception does not.
B. Celebrity ControlCreates Deception
The right of publicity provides the assignee control of the hero's
image. Once the advertiser obtains the license, the advertiser may say
what it wants about the hero and may prevent others from saying what is
true or even what the hero himself wishes to allow. 146 Paradoxically, the
right of publicity rests on a misperception that the First Amendment
tolerates control of commercial speech beyond regulation against
deception, so that, the right of publicity creates deception in advertising.
Providing assignable ownership to people's images means that the rights to
the discourse goes to the highest bidder. Granting image-control to the
celebrity, or the assignee, assures that only their approved version is
presented.
147
In Nature's Way Products, Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc.,
the
plaintiff, a well-known herbalist, sold his former business and recipes to
the defendant. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
advertising that the plaintiff had developed the defendant's herbal
formulae. 48 The defendant argued that "the right of publicity does not
protect dissemination of historical information .

. .

.

In granting the

143. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring public figure plaintiffs to
prove damaging falsity published by defendant with actual malice).
144. Proof of trademark infringement requires proof of a likelihood of confusion between
the symbols of two parties. See Lanham Act § 43(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (1994). In
fact, trademark seems an apt theory of law to protect against unfair appropriations of identity,
e.g., a trademark smile. But Professor McCarthy argues that trademark cannot be used to
protect publicity interests in an individual's identity because identity "is inherent in being a
human being ...." MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 5.2[C][1], at 5-12. This purely personal

aspect to the right seems contrary to the notion, which he embraces, of a right of publicity as a
freely assignable and descendible property right.
145. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
146. Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (U.K.) Ltd., 13 Ch. 532 (1994).
147. 736 F. Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1990).
148. Id.at 247.
149. Id. at 253.
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injunction, the court noted that the defendant was using the historical
information to market a product completely different from the historical
information itself.
However, a consumer choosing between two
different brands of herbal remedies should be entitled to this truthful
information. By outlawing factual information about the product, the
Nature 's Way decision gives too much censorial control to the plaintiff.
In Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,15 1 a famous race
car driver successfully sued R.J. Reynolds for the unauthorized use of a
picture of his distinctive race car, even though Motschenbacher himself
was not recognizable.15 2 The court noted that although some minor
changes to the car's exterior were made, the markings were "not only
peculiar to the [driver's] car but they caused some persons to think the car
in question was plaintiffs and to infer that the person driving the car was
the plaintiff."' 5 3 Although some could have believed that the race car
pictured was the plaintiffs, the mere use of the photograph hardly
constituted an endorsement.
In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 154 the defendant
used the name "Here's Johnny" for a portable toilet service. The court
decided that use of the introduction from Carson's late night show was
sufficient to identify Johnny Carson and therefore was a violation of
Carson's publicity rights. 155 In dissent, Judge Kennedy argued that the
term "Here's Johnny" was "more akin to an idea or concept."' 156 Thus
"[a]part from the possibility of outright federal [copyright] preemption,
public policy requires that the public's interest in free enterprise and free
expression take precedence over any interest Johnny Carson may have in a
phrase associated with his person."'15 7 In addition to the proprietor's
interest in linking a celebrity's persona with his product, the public also
has an interest in hearing commentary on public heroes, especially when it
is factual, creative or humorous and where no endorsement could
reasonably be implied.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id.at 822.
Id. at 827.
698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id.at 836.
Id. at 841.
Id.
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C. Impersonations
In cases where a celebrity's identity is evoked by an impersonator, a
of publicity
violation of the right
158 often results. For example, in Onassis v.
•
ChristianDior-New York Inc., the plaintiff sued Dior for using a Jackie
Onassis look-alike in an advertisement.1 59 The defendants argued that they
had not used a picture or portrait of Jackie Onassis as expressly prohibited
by the New York privacy statute. 160 However, the court held that the
statute's protections were broader, stating that "[n]o one is free to trade on
another's name or appearance and claim immunity because what he is
using is similar to but not identical with the original."' 16 Likewise, a
federal court applying the New York statute held that when "the look-alike
seems indistinguishable from the real person and the context of the
advertisement clearly implies that he or she is the real celebrity, . . . the
look-alike's [depiction can be considered] a picture or portrait"
of the
162
celebrity and thus be an infringement of the right of publicity.
The same rationale has been applied in two California "sound-alike"
cases.163 In Midler, an advertising agency hired a former backup vocalist
for Midler and instructed her to "sound as much as possible like the Bette
Midler record."' 64 In establishing a common law action for sound-alikes,
the Ninth Circuit emphasized that "[a] voice is as distinctive and personal
165
as a face . . . . To impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity."'
Although a court could reasonably interpret this type of imitation as
deceptive, it is still unclear how dissimilar a style must be to avoid suit.
Unfortunately, courts have gone further by allowing actions against
impersonators
where there was no likelihood of confusion and thus no
66
deception.

158. 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 258.
161. Id. at 261.
162. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (interpreting the
New York privacy statute, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51, which prohibits the use of one's
"name, portrait or picture," and finding for plaintiff Woody Allen against a look-alike but only
on false endorsement claim). But see Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp.
826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to recognize sound-alikes under the New York statute).
163. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
164. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
165. Id. at 463.

166. See generally Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equ,. Co., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1995).
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Just because an impersonator evokes a celebrity's identity does not
mean the celebrity should succeed in a claim against the impersonator.
The performance of a successful impersonator, like Rich Little imitating
President Richard Nixon, or Dana Carvey imitating H. Ross Perot, is the
result of talent and hard work and presents the viewer with the persona of
the impersonator as much as that of the impersonated.
Thus, the
appropriate standard should be the likelihood-of-confusion test. Imposing
this standard would dispose of the numerous cases brought against Elvis
impersonators, 167 unless the fact-finder believes that Elvis lives.
D. Transformative Uses
In cases where a transformative use is made of an original work, and
the new use makes reference to a public person, the transformative use
should be protected by the First Amendment. Although the transformative
use borrows from the original creation, it is nevertheless a work of its own.
In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 168 a Samsung
advertisement depicted a robot dressed in a gown, wig, and jewelry
intending to imitate the game show hostess Vanna White. 69 Samsung
argued unsuccessfully that the advertisement was a "spoof' and should be
protected under a theory analogous to that provided by the fair use doctrine
of copyright law.170
One justification for intellectual property protection is to have the
public profit from the availability of creative works. Copyright law seeks
to achieve this goal by providing sole license power as an incentive to the
creator of the original work while allowing other fair use of that work.

167. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1991);
Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
168. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
169. Id. at 1399.
170. Id. Under copyright law, a parody is a permissive fair use of the original work if it
meets the requirements set forth in section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). This provision allows fair use of a copyrighted
work for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research. It lists four factors for courts to weigh in determining whether a use falling within the
general scope of fair use is in fact fair:
(1) the purpose and the character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
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Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit panel majority's decision in White,
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski argued that the majority's decision
undermined the public's access to creative works by giving the artist too
much control.171 Judge Kozinski asked where would it have led "[i]f every
author and celebrity had been given the right to keep people from mocking
them or their work? Surely this would have
made the world poorer, not
172
richer, culturally as well as economically."'
Another justification for granting protection to the celebrity is to
prevent unjust enrichment of the appropriator. Like any other artist, a
parodist has invested time and labor to create the parody, and thus deserves
the profit he has earned. 173 In the White case, the unjust enrichment
argument hardly justifies the result. Vanna White is a game show hostess.
She did not create the show. The defendant's allusion to the show on
which she appeared may have used some concepts from the show, but they
clearly added something original.
When analyzing the applicability of the fair use defense, courts
examine whether parody takes the place of the original work. If the
audience of a parody does not have an interest in the original work, then
the parody will not affect the market for the original work. 174 Clearly,
Vanna White was not displaced by a robot impersonator. Furthermore, no
consumer would have confused the robot with Vanna White or believed
Vanna White endorsed the product. As long as the work is clearly
recognizable as a parody, there should be no right of publicity violation.
E. Non-Commercial Violations
Contrary to the categorical approach to application of the First
Amendment are cases where non-commercial speech has been found to
violate one's right of publicity. 175 Instead of accepting that these are
merely exceptions to the rule, it may be argued that the nature of the
appropriation (i.e., was the use deceptive or so extensive as to be a theft,
or, alternatively, was the use informational or transformative?) is more

171. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,

dissenting).
172. Id.at 1516.
173. See Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist'sClaim to Fame: A Parody Exception to
the Right of Publicity,27 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 97, 107 (1993).
174. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
175. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Estate of
Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229

U.S.P.Q. 1015 (BNA) (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 8.15[A], at
8-99.

68

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 18

important than simply applying the commercial/non-commercial test to
any use.
In Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co., 176 the only U.S.
Supreme Court case to recognize the right of publicity, the Court focused
not on the medium but on the nature and extent of the use. 177 In Zacchini,
the entire performance of a circus performer known as the human
cannonball, was recorded and replayed on a television news program
against the express request of the performer. 17 The Court held that even a
presentation which could be labeled "news" was actionable because it
"poses a substantial threat to the economic value" of the plaintiff's
publicity rights. 179 Thus, the Court did not accept a First Amendment
defense based on the defendant's status as a member of the media or that
the use was confined to a news program. 18 Instead, the court looked to the
nature of the particular expression and decided it was more theft than
news. 181
However dangerous this opinion seems to First Amendment
principles-setting the courts loose as censors upon non-commercial
speech-the holding returns to a case-by-case balancing approach. It can
be argued that Zacchini is consistent with the idea that all references are
protected by the First Amendment as long as there is not wholesale theft or
deception. Whatever threat to First Amendment principles the Zacchini
decision holds as precedent for right of publicity cases is limited by the
unusual facts of the case, specifically, that Zacchini's entire act was taken.
Although not fixed by the performer, the taped broadcast of a performance
tangibly appropriates the creative effort and the product of the performer.
The contours of the performance are distinguishable both in kind and by
degree from an idea or a reference to a free-floating image. As such,
Zacchini may be considered a right of performance case better handled by
18 2
common law copyright than a right of publicity case.
Thus, it may be said that the Supreme Court has not approved any
typical right of publicity cases. I1 3 In fact, in approving the right of
176. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
177. Id. at 578-79.
178. Id. at 563-64.
179. Id. at 575.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 576.
182. Federal copyright law does not protect unfixed live events. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1993).
183. Professor McCarthy accepts that the Zacchini decision protects performance values
and not recognition values, which are the essence of the right of publicity. McCARTHY, supra
note 10, § 8.12[A], at 8-92.
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publicity in Zacchini, the Court relied heavily on the "economic incentive"
argument as the necessary impetus for an entertainer "to make the
the public."'18 4
investment required to produce a performance of interest to
The Court noted that the economic incentive rationale is much more
compelling when a performer's entire act has been appropriated than it is
in the typical right of publicity case:
[T]he broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike the
unauthorized use of another's name for purposes of trade ...
goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an
entertainer. Thus, in this case, Ohio has recognized what may
be the strongest case for a "right of publicity"-involving, not
the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to enhance the
attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of
the entertainer acquired his
the very activity by which
85
reputation in the first place.'
Thus, Zacchini is the rare case that, if overly relied upon, makes bad law.
Although recording and replaying an entire performance without consent
probably should be actionable, any offhand reference should not be.
Posing a much greater threat to free speech than the few cases that
ultimately succeed against non-commercial uses are the numerous cases in
which celebrity plaintiffs evade summary judgment. 186 When courts
decide that a triable issue of fact exists for uses that arise in noncommercial settings, parties with deep pockets are able to inhibit
Such
performers and the press by nevertheless litigating a losing case.,
cases illustrate the advantages to maintaining bright-line rules. Without
them, courts would be forced to balance an individual's property interest in
her identity against the value of the trespasser's use. Having judges decide
what speech is valuable enough to be protected by the First Amendment is
contrary to a free-marketplace-of-ideas approach and could introduce an
open season on commercial and non-commercial speech.
Although a strict bright-line rule exempting all non-commercial users
might solve this problem, such a solution might continue to limit all uses
deemed commercial, regardless of their merits or whether they were
deceptive, while permitting the type of wholesale theft that occurred in
Zacchini. An alternative solution similar to that adopted under a copyright
184. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
185. Id.

186. See, e.g., Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (1995);
Stem v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
187. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968) (rejecting attempt by Howard Hughes to suppress an unauthorized biography).
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as
fair use analysis would be to weigh the non-commercial nature of a use
claim.1 88
merely on factor in favor of immunity from a right of publicity
VI. CHALLENGING THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

A. Just Desserts
One justification for limiting the free use of a celebrity's image is
that the image is a product of the celebrity's skill and hard work. Applying
Locke's theory of property, it has been said that "image" is something the
celebrity has invested labor to create, thereby gaining a property interest in
his or her image.' 8 9 Once the celebrity acquires the right to prevent people
from using the image without consent, the celebrity also obtains an
opportunity to receive consideration in exchange for the consent, thus
rewarding the celebrity for creating the image.
Yet, because a heroic image is so artfully crafted, it is possible to
mistake the creation for the creator. As with an actor speaking a writer's
lines upon a director's instruction, the image created may be the product of
several people, but the right of publicity credits only the actor with the
persona created. Giving the hero sole credit for the image means accepting
heroic fiction as fact. As a result, the personal property right in the image
is given to the object of creation, rather than to those actually responsible
for a shared creation. Thus, to the extent that the right of publicity vests in
the hero, the hero obtains undue control over use of the image and unjust
enrichment by receiving the rights and benefits for an image the hero is
only partly responsible for creating. As the Ninth Circuit held in White,
' 90
the property value in one's image may be just the result of "dumb luck."'
Even if the celebrity has gained fame through skill and hard work,
this effort does not entitle the celebrity to complete control over the use of
the public image. The argument, which amounts to a defense against the
right of publicity, is that having thrust themselves into the public spotlight,
celebrities must bear a greater burden of public comment.
As the majority
191
in Cardtoons noted: "[F]ame is a double-edged sword."'

188.
189.
190.
191.
1996).

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
See, e.g., McCARTHY, supra note 10, § 2.1[D], at 2-8.
White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir.
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B. Unjust Enrichment
Even if the just desserts argument fails in White, as Vanna White did
not (exclusively) create her own image, the response is: "Why should
Samsung benefit from Vanna White's fame?" Although Samsung obtains
some value from its game show depiction of Vanna White without
providing her compensation, Samsung's ability to depict her without fear
of liability outweighs Vanna White's interest. Courts should consider
society's entitlement to Samsung's creation. The hero's ability to control
his or her own image must be balanced against society's ability to use
heroic images as a means of public discourse.
The public media, as a forum for transmitting images for public
consumption, and as a commercial enterprise, relies on heroes to tell
stories, to educate, to titillate, to attract an audience, and to sell
newspapers, magazines, radio shows, television programming, movies, and
web sites.
Besides purveying public images, the media is itself
manipulated by the public. The media acts as a proxy for public views.
The media is a market that reflects consumer interest and creates fame.
The public creates its heroes, and thus should have a right to use them
short of deception or wholesale theft.
C. Media andHeroes Sell
Conveniently, heroes seeking publicity and the media trading on
public interest in the portrayal of public images are engaged in a mutually
beneficial relationship. To a great extent they are engaged in a singular
commercial enterprise. The celebrity persona helps sell newspapers and
newspapers help "sell" a celebrity's persona. From People Magazine to
The NationalEnquirer,from CBS Evening News to EntertainmentTonight,
from up-close and in-person Olympic vignettes to locker-room interviews,
from fireside chats to political convention speeches, from sneaker
advertisements to infomercials, heroic images are constantly being
manufactured and "sold."
While the media merely provides interesting images to build an
audience, heroes would like greater control of their public images. So,
although they share an enterprise, there is conflict between the purveyors
and the purveyed. The battle between them has led the law to impose
several different types of limits on what can be said about heroes. If the
image presented is untrue and damaging, the hero may claim defamation.
For public figures, the courts have set higher standards of proof for
defamation. Not only has the hero voluntarily thrust him or herself into
the vortex of public affairs, but the ability to speak freely about public
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figures without fear of litigation has been considered essential to the First
Amendment value of encouraging free discourse and wide-ranging public
debate. The public uses heroes to help describe and define our world. It is
as if by protecting our right of hero depiction we achieve a greater freedom
of cultural self-definition. Since the stock in trade of images is both
commercially and intellectually valuable, it should only be restrained to
prevent outright falsity.
The sale of media images differs from the sale of goods. By their
nature, images are not tangible, so they are difficult to sell on their own.
Thus, the sale of an image is usually linked to the sale of something else.
For example, the television-viewing public creates a market in images
(programming) that allows a sponsor to subsidize the broadcast in return
for the opportunity to present advertising. The "sale" of programming to
the viewer represents value that is then resold to sponsors according to
demand. 92 Thus, the sale of programming to the public is indirect and is
paid for in the cost of the sponsor's products. Similarly, celebrity images
presented in ads sell interest in consuming (watching) the ad and in
consuming (purchasing) the product.
Although images are intangible, and their sale is often indirect, they
are still commodities and their exchange must be considered as
"commercial" as any more tangible commodities. Moreover, it cannot be
claimed that there is a distinction between the message of the commercial
and the message of the surrounding television program. The medium is
the message and, to some extent, the message of both is "buy." Nothing
prevents the characters in a situation comedy from dropping their roles and
expressing their affection for dish soap and urging its consumption, as they
sometimes do. It might be unseemly for Peter Jennings to unabashedly
plug products, but cynics would say that he refrains from such blatant
commercialism only because of the damage it would do to his image of
dignity and journalistic detachment,
an image that must be maintained in
193
order to better sell dish soap.
Certainly, it can be said that the aim of the media is to sell, even if
selling is not its only aim. The media sells images by educating and

192. The print media, although its product is more tangible than that of the electronic
media and can be purchased directly by the public, also derive the major portion of their income
from advertising. Traditionally, in television and radio, consumption could only be measured
by viewer or listener ratings, but cable television alters this equation when charging viewers
directly. The question with the Internet remains, "Who pays?"
193. See generally EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE (1973) (analyzing
television broadcast companies as business organizations composed of employees whose
primary motivation is the perpetuation of the organization and their own careers, and who
therefore make broadcasting decisions based on what sells).
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entertaining, and so do commercials. The appropriation of heroic images
is not degraded by selling something in addition to an ideal. There is
nothing inherently evil in linking a heroic image with a sale, whether
offered by ancient authors or Madison Avenue ad writers.
Speech contains a mixture of motives. If the use of public figures for
commentary is valuable and mass media is our forum for public discourse
in advertisements as well as shows, then the forum needs protection.
Selling does not preempt creativity and social commentary. In fact,
because there is selling, the advertiser must speak to the viewer to hold his
attention. Even if an empirical survey of advertising reveals that nothing
of value is being said, why preclude this format from the meaning that
commentary on public figures can impart?
VII. CONCLUSION

As with ancient heroes, to a great extent modem heroic images are
manipulations used to help tell stories and to sell those stories. But
modem heroes, perhaps because they are alive, have images that change.
Their images are not fixed upon creation, but reflect an on-going public
dialogue about good and evil. We create and re-create our heroes as they
move before a backdrop of changing social ideals. In heroic images we
see images of ourselves and images of perfection. Only by protecting the
ability to freely evoke heroic images without assigning censorship control
to the hero can we as a society aspire to virtue-on baseball cards and
portable toilets.
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